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BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

1957


III

INDICATIONS OF INTENSIFIED CLANDESTINE
COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITIES

3. In a number of instances these clandestine cadres have been built up slowly against great difficulties over many years. In the case of one significant party, the cadre reportedly has grown from a mere handful of 50 such people in 1930 to a total strength in 1956 of 3,600 in government, the professions, and political parties and mass organizations. In other instances this clandestine cadre, although still consisting of only a handful of people, ^{are} ~~are~~ drawn from an equally small, educated national elite, and the positions they have attained over the course of years combined with their successful concealment of their status as individuals under Communist party discipline more than compensates for their lack of numbers.

4. While it is obviously impossible to discern or describe a general pattern, several factors indicate that particular attention should be paid to clandestine Communist Party activities and their various purposes. ~~For example~~ There is evidence that increased use is being made of certain of the international Communist front organizations for Soviet intelligence purposes.

retain -> ~~For example~~, the Trade Union International (TUI) of ^{of the WFTU} Public and Allied Employees on 5 June 1956 sent out a questionnaire concerning government budgets; the replies allegedly were to be used as the basis for an article which would appear in the TUI's information bulletin. Special place was given in the questionnaire to the proportion of government budgets allotted for military spending. On 6 June the same TUI issued a questionnaire pertaining to the legal status of government employees. The ~~obvious~~ interest which a Soviet intelligence service would have in such matters in planning operations of deep cover agents is apparent. Answers to the last questionnaire would be helpful also to Soviet staff personnel using Communist Party penetration agents in government employ. ~~In other areas there is evidence that the Communist Party's information procurement work against United States military installations and aircraft has been stepped up.~~

 *paper basis!*
Re-indications of
intensified clandestine
CP activities.

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10. Another significant ~~development~~ *factor* having potential bearing on intensified clandestine activity is ~~a~~ firmly evidenced ~~message~~ *message* CPSU and, especially, *LATIN AMERICAN* ~~CP China~~ *CP China*, training of CP leaders from certain ~~under developed~~ countries. Selection, documentation, and travel of the trainees have been ~~handled~~ *darkening*, at least in notable aspects, on a clandestine basis. It is reasonably anticipated that the training will increase the clandestine capabilities of the trainees and their respective Communist Parties.

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8. Innumerable reports indicate that offices and meeting places of some of the Soviet sponsored friendship societies serve espionage purposes. Attendants of reading rooms and libraries of certain of these societies are known to have acted as intelligence agents either for the Soviets or for another Iron Curtain intelligence service having its staff personnel under official cover as Cultural Attaches.

9. The extremely militant and aggressive tone of ~~the~~ recent Soviet military publications may be an indication ^{of} GRU and KGB thinking. It is reasonable to assume that Moscow's heightened interest in Western military capabilities will be translated into an intensified espionage program which probably will have to be supported by the Communist Parties. *There is evidence that in some areas Communist Party information placement work will include US military installations and aircraft bases.*

II. Organizational Elements of Current Clandestine Communist Party Operations

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1. In view of the scattered indications described it may therefore be useful to recapitulate the organizational forms of clandestine Communist Party operations which have been observed in recent times. These forms pertain to the offensive operations of the Communist Party. They should not be confused with the organizational forms employed by the Communist Party when it is declared illegal. In the illegal as well as legal period the

clandestine operations of the Communist Party may be discharged by a variety of secret units more or less loosely coordinated.

2. A well-developed clandestine apparatus of a Communist Party in the West probably will have all or some of the following elements--standard planning for Communist underground organization would include all:

- a. the leadership --usually supplied by one or two high-ranking officers of the open Party; plus an administrative bureau if the underground section is of sufficient size to warrant it;

b. a unit of secret party members either of professional background
or having special qualifications, who may occupy high-level
government positions at regional or central level, or key posts in
other political parties, labor unions or other large organizations.
These persons are usually kept as a reserve to perform highly
confidential tasks as needed by the Party or possibly by Soviet
intelligence. They are directly under the administration of a
headquarters unit of the Party. Such groups existed in the United
States in the period shortly after World War II as "pro-groups".
Regional direction was provided by a Pro-Council which was in direct
contact with Party headquarters in New York City--presumably with
that unit responsible for underground members of this category.
For penetration of key positions--not only of government but in
leadership positions of all types of mass organizations, the Communist
Parties rely upon persons of this category. ~~And~~^{IN} countries where
the Parties enjoy a mass status, people of this category are of importance
in effecting thorough infiltration and even covert control of non-Communist
organizations and government agencies.

c. a central headquarters unit which directs fractions working within
the ranks of non-Communist trade unions, other political parties, and
other non-Communist mass organizations. Considerable information
about Communist fractions working within the ranks of non-Communist
organizations has been reported. The regulations are similar in all
areas; variations which appear are attributable to the varying degrees
of suppression under which each Communist Party may find itself.
Work in the fractions must be carried out by persons not generally known
as Communists; fraction members must follow instructions provided by
the fraction leader; they must try to infiltrate sensitive parts of the
target organization; they must not show friendship or close connection
with other members of the fraction; they must report to the Communist
Party any information they learn through membership in the target
organization.

~~SECRET~~

d. a military unit which will be responsible for propaganda work among armed forces personnel; for planning for adequate supplies of arms and ammunition in time of political crisis; for exploiting any political disturbances to Communist advantage and to take over the leadership of any national rebellion against foreign "imperialism" or local reactionary authority; to plan and direct acts of sabotage. (One KGB defector has stated that all sabotage action carried out by a Communist Party will be under the ultimate direction of KGB. A recent report shows that two West European Communist Parties intend to step up their sabotage programs. These are to include slowing down or halting of production of war goods, attempts to sabotage transport and delivery of such production, etc. Guidance for Communist sabotage work in these two countries is to be provided by a third Communist Party. Possibly this apparent guidance from a Communist Party claiming to have more experience in clandestine work will be provided by an agent KGB ^{NGR} may have in the Communist Party concerned.)

e. An intelligence unit which will be directed by one of the Party's highest ranking leaders who is in direct or indirect contact with KGB. *a. intelligence*

There is evidence in one non-Orbit country that intelligence directives requesting information of military nature are being issued by two

District Committees of the Communist Party. In this country and in others there is evidence that information which could be of operational use to an intelligence service is being sought by means of questionnaires issued by the Communist Party. *2. some areas the "intelligence unit"*

f. one or more technical units (or a "technical apparatus") which is responsible for maintaining a supply of safehouses, cover firms, documentation, escape routes, supplies of printing and mimeographing equipment, etc.

may consist of one CP leader who acts as go-between for Soviet intelligence.